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T he Reagan Administration expressed its enforcement policy for
horizontal mergers in Merger Guidelines issued in 1982 and 1984
("DOJ Guidelines"),' implemented its policy through its specific enforce-
ment actions pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 and proposed to
codify its policy in amendments to section 7.3 A substantial number of
academicians, practitioners, and legislators have vocally objected to the
Administration's policy, contending that it is substantially too lax. The
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) now has gone beyond
mere criticism. It has announced the intention of state attorneys general
to challenge mergers they believe to be anticompetitive 4 and has issued
* Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. The views expressed
herein do not purport to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice. B.A., University
of Cincinnati (1973); M.A., University of Cincinnati (1974); M.A., University of Wisconsin
(1976); Ph.D., University of Wisconsin (1977).
1 The 1982 DOJ Merger Guidelines are reprinted at 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
4501-05. The 1984 DOJ Merger Guidelines are reprinted at 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
4491-95.
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
1 See [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1253, at S-8--S-10 (Feb. 20,
1986); [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1300, at 152 (Jan. 29, 1987);
Ginsburg, The Reagan Administration's Legislative Initiative in Antitrust, 31 Antitrust
Bull. 851 (1986).
4 See, e.g., [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at 477 (March 12,
1987)(quoting New York Attorney General Robert Abrams).
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its own enforcement guidelines for horizontal mergers ("NAAG Guide-
lines").6
The NAAG's principal objection to the DOJ Guidelines appears to be
that "the process of market definition in the Justice Department's
Guidelines will, in many respects, overstate the bounds of both the
geographic and product market in relation to the actual workings of the
marketplace. This will result in the systematic understatement of market
shares used in calculating market concentration."6 Thus, instead of
proposing to challenge mergers involving lower market shares and lower
levels of market concentration than those necessary to trigger enforce-
ment action by the Department of Justice, the NAAG proposed to use
roughly the same numerical standards but to delineate markets more
narrowly and thereby increase market shares and concentration. 7
The purpose of this Article is to show that the NAAG Guidelines, not
the DOJ Guidelines, produce systematic errors in market delineation.
The NAAG Guidelines understate the scope of markets. Although the
NAAG Guidelines proclaim their reliance on the actual workings of the
marketplace and on "market realities",8 their quarrel with the DOJ
Guidelines on market delineation reveals a pronounced blind spot and a
baseless fear that the Justice Department is intent on sabotaging merger
enforcement.
Section I outlines the approach to market delineation in the DOJ
Guidelines, reviews how the Justice Department has applied them in
cases with court decisions on the merits, and analyzes the NAAG
Guidelines' criticisms of the DOJ Guidelines' approach to market delin-
eation. Section H outlines the approach to market delineation of the
NAAG Guidelines, notes many vagaries in this approach, and explains
how it yields markets that are overly narrow. Finally, Section M
summarizes the arguments and provides concluding remarks.
I. MARKET DELINEATION UNDER THE DOJ GumELmES
A. The Theory
The DOJ Guidelines start with the "unifying theme" that the goal of
merger enforcement is to prevent those mergers, and only those mergers,
that "create or enhance 'market power' or facilitate its exercise." Market
power is defined as the "ability of one or more firms profitably to
I Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General
(March 10, 1987)(hereinafter referred to in this Article as the "NAAG Guidelines"),
reprinted in [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, Special Supp. (March
12, 1987)(hereinafter Special Supp.).
r NAAG Guidelines § 4 n.31, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-8.
7 See generally id.
8 See NAAG Guidelines § 1, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-3.
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maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of
time."9 The DOJ Guidelines' approach to market delineation flows
directly from this unifying theme.10 The primary mechanism through
which mergers may create or enhance market power is the facilitation of
collusion. 11 The DOJ Guidelines, therefore, delineate markets so that
market shares and concentration indices for those markets will be as
meaningful as possible in an assessment of the likelihood of collusion.
In particular, the DOJ Guidelines define a market as:
[A] product or group of products and a geographic area in which
it is sold such that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not
subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future
seller of those products in that area would impose a "small but
significant and nontransitory" increase in price above prevailing
or likely future levels. 12
The sole criterion used to delineate markets under the DOJ Guidelines,
thus, is the answer to this hypothetical question: Would a monopolist or
cartel over a particular product in a particular area raise price signifi-
cantly? If the answer is in the affirmative, that product and that area
constitute a market.
The precise procedure for implementing the DOJ Guidelines' approach
to market delineation is somewhat complicated;' 3 however, the basics are
quite simple. One considers in turn each product (narrowly defined) and
each production point of each of the merging firms and asks whether a
hypothetical monopolist of that product in that area would raise the price
significantly. If the answer is yes, then the product and area constitute a
market. If the answer is no, then the next best substitute product or area
is added, and the question is asked again. In adding products or areas, all
equally situated products or areas must be added. Exactly what consti-
tutes a significant price increase is not explicitly defined by the DOJ
9 1984 DOJ Guidelines § 1.0, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CC) 14491.
10 For an explanation of how all of the provisions of the DOJ Guidelines flow from this
unifying theme, see Werden, Merger Guidelines Present Basic Analytic Paradigm, Legal
Times, June 28, 1982, at 20.
' There surely are other ways in which mergers could create or enhance market power.
For the most part, these other mechanisms do not have any different implication for market
delineation. In any event, it is clear that collusion-in fact, explicit collusion-is the
mechanism with which the DOJ Guidelines are concerned. See Panel Discussion, 54
Antitrust L.J. 31, 33 (1985)(remarks of William F. Baxter). The DOJ Guidelines also
explicitly address the issue of single-firm market power. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines § 3.12, 2
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 14493.20.
12 1984 DOJ Guidelines § 2.0, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 14492.
1 What follows is drawn from the 1984 DOJ Guidelines §§ 2.0, 2.11, 2.31, 2 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) U 4492, 4492.101, 4492.301; Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice
Department's Merger Guidelines, 1983 Duke L.J. 514.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Guidelines, but generally they use a price increase of five percent lasting
for one year.
For any group of products and area that constitute a market under the
DOJ Guidelines, there is a family of larger, inclusive groups of products
and areas, each member of which generally also constitutes a market.
The reason for this is simply that a monopolist over a particular range in
product and geographic space generally would raise the price at least as
much as a monopolist over any smaller, included range. The DOJ
Guidelines generally take the smallest group of products and area that
satisfy their definition of a market to be the relevant market from any
family of markets. There is a relevant market for each product and
production point of each merging firm. In addition, there may be an
additional, smaller relevant market if particular customer groups may be
subject to price discrimination.
B. The Practice
The DOJ Guidelines' approach to market delineation is implemented
by using all available evidence to answer the hypothetical questions
posed. This involves two sorts of judgment calls. First, it generally is
necessary to be somewhat more specific than the DOJ Guidelines
themselves about what constitutes a significant price increase. Second,
and far more important, it is necessary to interpret a variety of kinds of
indirect evidence, since it is extremely unlikely that direct evidence will
exist addresssing the hypothetical questions posed. 14 If there is a serious
flaw with the Justice Department's approach to a market definition of the
sort implied by the NAAG Guidelines, it must be with either or both of
these sorts of judgment calls. Obviously, both very small and very large
markets are possible if what constitutes a significant price increase can
be defined arbitrarily. Thus, the best indication of whether the Justice
Department actually is defining markets too broadly would be what it
has done in actual cases. The only cases with readily available informa-
tion of this sort are ones with court decisions on the merits. Those cases
are particularly interesting because the courts' view of relevant markets
can be contrasted with the Department's. There appear to be six such
cases decided since the issuance of the 1982 DOJ Guidelines. 15
14 The DOJ Guidelines do not contain a formula that uses objective evidence to delineate
markets. Thus, the DOJ Guidelines provide a way of thinking about the issue rather than
a simple way of settling it.
15 The paucity of litigated cases has led one commentator to propose that the govern-
ment be required to publish some sort of description of its analysis in each case in which
additional information was requested (second request) under the provisions of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1982). See Jorde,
Restoring Predictability to Merger Guideline Analysis, 4 ComTwp. PoL'Y IssuEs 1 (1986). An
obvious reason why this proposal would not yield the increased information sought is that
[Vol. 35:403
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The first of these is United States v. Waste Management, Inc.,16 which
actually was tried before the issuance of the 1982 DOJ Guidelines. The
case involved the merger of two trash collection and disposal firms, both
of which operated in Dallas and Houston. The Justice Department
alleged that there were distinct relevant markets for trash collection in
both Dallas and Houston for each of two types of trucks---"front load" and
"roll-off'. The trial court accepted the geographic boundaries of the
Department's proposed market but rejected its proposed product bound-
aries. The court defined the market to include all "commercial" trash
collection, including both of the two types of trucks the Department
alleged to be in distinct markets, and other types of trucks as well. The
district court found that in Dallas the merger violated section 7.17 The
court of appeals upheld the district court's findings on markets and
market shares, but reversed on the grounds that entry was "so easy that
any anti-competitive impact of the merger before us would be eliminated
more quickly by such competition than by litigation."' 8
The first case to be tried (at least in part) after the 1982 DOJ
Guidelines were issued was United States u. Virginia National Bank-
shares, Inc.,19 in which the Department challenged the merger of two
rural banks in Virginia. The Department alleged that the relevant
markets were various individual banking services in Wise County,
Virginia. The court rejected the geographic dimensions of the Depart-
ment's proposed market in favor of smaller markets, causing the merging
firms to be in two separate markets. The court, therefore, also rejected the
Department's challenge to the merger.20
In another bank merger case, United States v. Central State Bank,21 the
Department alleged that the relevant markets were two distinct prod-
ucts-transaction (checking) accounts and small business loans-in
Benzie County, Michigan. The court found that the single relevant
geographic market was the cluster of banking services in Benzie and
Grand Traverse counties. As a result of the court's determination that the
the government's decisions normally turn on difficult factual judgments. All that could be
reported, given the confidentiality requirements of Hart-Scott-Rodino (see 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(h)(1982)) would be the bottom-line judgment made. In addition, some cases in which
a second request is made are not analyzed very extensively. For example, the second request
may reveal that merging firms do not make the same or similar products, at which point the
investigation is terminated.
16 588 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), reu'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
17 Id.
Is 743 F.2d at 983.
19 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982).
20 Id.
21 621 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mich. 1985), affd, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987). The case was
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) because, at the time,
section 7 of the Clayton Act applied only to acquisitions of corporations by corporations (see
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)), and the acquisitions challenged were by an individual.
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relevant geographic market was much larger than the Department has
alleged, the market shares of the merging firms were found to be very
small, and the merger was found not to violate the antitrust laws.22 The
Department appealed on market delineation but to no avail.23
In United States v. Calmar Inc.,24 the Justice Department challenged
the merger of two producers of plastic pumps and sprayers used to
dispense liquids. The Department alleged two relevant product mar-
kets--"regular sprayers" and "regular [pump] dispensers". The court
found that the single relevant product market included both of these
products as well as two other types of sprayers and larger pump
dispensers. Even in the court's broader relevant market, the market
shares and concentration were quite high, but the Department was
denied the preliminary injunction it sought on the grounds that entry
was very easy.25
The only case in which the Department prevailed is United States v.
Rice Growers Association of California,26 in which the Justice Depart-
ment challenged the merger of two rice milling firms in California. The
Department alleged three relevant product markets. One was the acqui-
sition of rice for milling in California, and the court found that this was
a relevant market. The other two product markets were the sale of two
specific kinds of rice in the Pacific Region, and both of these were rejected
by the court. On one the court found that the type of rice was not a
sufficient basis for defining the market, and for the other, the court found
that the geographic scope of the market was nationwide.2 7
The final Justice Department case decided under the DOJ Guidelines is
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,28 in which the Department
challenged the acquisition by one producer of high fructose corn syrup of
a long-term lease on two plants owned by another. The Department
alleged that the relevant market was high fructose corn syrup in the
United States. The court rejected this contention, holding that the
2 id.
23 The district court stated that its conclusion on the product dimensions of the market
was compelled by precedent: 'The Court finds that, as a matter of law, the relevant product
market in this case includes the cluster of services and products that comprise the full range
of services offered by commercial banks." 621 F. Supp. at 1292. The court of appeals
affirmed, but held that the district court's decision was based on the facts rather than the
law. 817 F.2d at 23-24.
24 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985).
2 Id.
2 1986-2 Trade Cas.(CCH) $ 67,288 (E.D. Cal. 1986). (This single victory is notable in
that the defendant called no witnesses.)
27 id.
28 No. 83-51-D3 (S.D. Iowa filed Aug. 6, 1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-2343SI (8th Cir.
Oct. 7, 1987). The district court denied defendants' earlier motion to dismiss the case on the
grounds that the lease was not within the scope of section 7. 584 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Iowa
1984).
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relevant market also included sugar and possibly other sweeteners,
granting defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that defendants'
market shares were insufficient to establish a violation in the broader
sweetener market.29
Surely these cases are not a consistent record of overly broad market
delineation. All of the markets were fairly narrow. In all but one case the
court found that the relevant market(s) was (were) broader than the
Department contended. 30 Moreover, the sole exception-Virginia Na-
tional Bankshares-is a case in which the Department's broader geo-
graphic market definition was essential to the finding of a violation. This
record also calls into question the assertion that the Department's merger
enforcement is far too lax. After all, the Department rarely wins in court
when it does challenge a merger. This record also clearly demonstrates
that even if the DOJ Guidelines did delineate overly broad markets as the
NAAG Guidelines assert, the result would not be "the systematic
understatement of market shares" and underenforcement. Incorrect
markets produce incorrect market shares, but there is no assurance that
increasing market size reduces the likelihood of a successful challenge.
Just the opposite occurred in Virginia National Bankshares.
C. The NAAG's Case Against the DOJ Guidelines
Regretably, the NAAG Guidelines merely state a conclusion about the
DOJ Guidelines, without any explanation. It is not possible, therefore, to
know for sure how the conclusion was reached or to analyze the logic of
the argument. However, it is fairly clear that the NAAG Guidelines'
treatment of market delineation was heavily influenced by the thinking
of Robert G. Harris and Thomas M. Jorde, two critics of market
delineation under the DOJ Guidelines who were acknowledged by the
NAAG Guidelines for "valuable comments, suggestions and advice on
the initial drafts." 31 Harris and Jorde had previously reached a
conclusion virtually identical to that in the NAAG Guidelines:
' No. 83-51-D (S.D. Iowa filed Aug. 6, 1987). [This case does not appear to be reported
even in CCH.]
'0 A similar pattern also can be seen for merger cases adjudicated by regulatory
agencies rather than litigated. For example, the Department of Justice opposed two airline
mergers on the grounds that they would substantially lessen competition. In both cases, the
Department contended that the relevant market was limited to nonstop service. The
Department of Transportation found that neither merger would substantially lessen
competition and generally included one-stop service in the relevant market. TWA-Ozark
Acquisition Case, Order No. 86-9-29 (Dept. of Transportation, Policy & Int'l Affairs, Sept.
12, 1986). NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, Order No. 86-7-81 (Dept. of Transportation,
Policy & Int'l Affairs, July 31, 1986).
", NAAG Guidelines acknowledgement, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-2. New York
Attorney General Robert Abrams also noted in a speech that the NAAG Guidelines
approach to market delineation is based on the work of Harris and Jorde. See [Jan.-June]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1309, at 642 (April 2, 1987).
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At every one of the major steps and at most of the subsidiary ones,
the [DOJ] Guidelines use procedures which have the effect of
increasing the size of the market, and therefore of reducing the
shares of the merging firms in the market. Although in some
cases the [DOJI Guidelines' methods may produce unbiased
results, it is uniformly true that whenever there is a possibility of
bias, it is always in the same direction of market expansion.3 2
Harris and Jorde also supply an explanation for this conclusion that the
DOJ Guidelines delineate overly broad markets. They assert that the
DOJ Guidelines are part of an unprincipled attempt to reduce merger
enforcement33 The NAAG Guidelines seem to have adopted Harris and
Jorde's conclusion and explanation as their own.
The argument put forth by Harris and Jorde consists almost entirely of
a series of misstatements about the DOJ Guidelines interspersed with
explanations of how the wrongly imputed approach would lead to
incorrect conclusions. The analysis offered is essentially correct, but it is
used to critique a phantom.34 Let us consider briefly each of Harris and
Jorde's points that relate to market size.
The first of Harris and Jorde's arguments is that the DOJ Guidelines
"lack institutional realism" and thereby overstate the extent to which
economic agents would react to price changes.35 Harris and Jorde do not
point to any specific language in the DOJ Guidelines that, in their view,
exhibits this lack of realism, and it appears that there is no specific
offending language. The DOJ Guidelines' approach to market delineation
plainly seeks to determine what actually would happen if a monopolist
came into existence. The only thing hypothetical about the inquiry is the
hypothetical monopolist. Harris and Jorde's criticism appears not di-
rected at the DOJ Guidelines themselves, but rather at how the Justice
Department is expected to apply them. In addressing the difficult issues
2 Harris & Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust
Enforcement, 71 CALw. L. RFv. 464, 486 (1983).
3 Id.
' The point is not that Harris and Jorde were malicious, but rather that they were
misinformed. It also must be acknowledged that the 1982 DOJ Guidelines were not a model
of clarity on market delineation. However, drafting problems were remedied in the 1984
DOJ Guidelines, and any misimpressions conveyed by the DOJ Guidelines' explanations
could be corrected through reference to their definition of a market (see text accompanying
note 12 supra). This definition was not substantially changed from the 1982 DOJ
Guidelines. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, n.6, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4502 n.6. That
definition, in turn, was fully explained in Werden, supra note 13.
5 Harris & Jorde, supra note 32, at 476-79. Harris and Jorde make a very similar point
about possible barriers to reacting to price increases under the rubric of "intermarket
mobility". See id. at 484-85.
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posed by the DOJ Guidelines, Harris and Jorde believe that the Justice
Department will too readily conclude that sellers will take advantage of
opportunities to increase profits and that buyers will take advantage of
opportunities to cut costs. To the extent there is objective evidence as to
the behavior of economic agents, there is no reason to believe that the
Department or the courts will ignore it. Absent objective evidence
however, optimizing behavior seems the best assumption, indeed the only
principled assumption possible.36
Second, Harris and Jorde argue that the 1982 DOJ Guidelines' proce-
dure of defining a "provisional market" and then expanding it could
produce overly broad markets because the "provisional market" could be
too broad.3 7 The logic is correct, but the premise is not. The DOJ
Guidelines did not intend for the 'provisional market" to be anything but
a very narrow group of products that could not possibly be too small.
However, the 1982 Guidelines did contain language suggesting other-
wise, and it was revised in the 1984 version. The Guidelines now state
that the "Department will begin with each product (narrowly defined)"
and with "the location of each merging firm", and there is no mention of
a "provisional market".38
Third, Harris and Jorde argue that the DOJ Guidelines may yield
overly broad markets if they ask whether a specific (e.g. five percent)
price increase would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist rather
than whether a price increase of at least that much actually would be
imposed by a hypothetical monopolist. 39 Again their logic is faultless. It
is quite possible that, for example, a five percent increase would not be
profitable but a larger price increase would be profitable and thus would be
imposed. 40 Again Harris and Jorde were mislead by the poor drafting in
the 1982 DOJ Guidelines which was corrected in the 1984 version. The
DOJ Guidelines' definition of a market is now clearly keyed to whether a
hypothetical monopolist "would impose" a significant price increase.41
36 An example illustrates the choice the Department and the courts must make. Suppose
that an executive replied in the negative when asked whether his firm would begin selling
its product in a particular area in the event of a price increase. Suppose further that the
objective evidence revealed no reason for the answer given and clearly showed that the firm
would profit from acting contrary to the executive's prediction. What should one conclude?
Probably that the executive has not thought the matter through and is mistaken. Of course,
if the executive has a good reason why the apparent profit opportunity is really not
attractive, there may be ample reason to accept his conclusion.
" See Harris & Jorde, supra note 32, at 479-81.
38 1984 DOJ Guidelines § 2.11,2.31,2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4492.10,4492.30. For
more thorough discussion on this point, see Werden, A CloserAnalysis ofAntitrust Markets,
62 WAsH. U.L.Q. 647, 655 n.51 (1985).
31 See Harris & Jorde, supra note 32, at 483.
40 For a complete explanation of the circumstances, see Werden supra note 13, at 542-45
& nn.93-94.
"' See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The earlier version was based on whether
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
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Finally,42 Harris and Jorde argue that the DOJ Guidelines will
delineate overly broad markets when market power already is being
exercised because the DOJ Guidelines use the prevailing price rather
than the competitive price as a benchmark. 43 However, the DOJ Guide-
lines permit the use of the competitive price if it is a "likely future price",
and in assessing the likely effects of a merger, the prevailing price is the
correct benchmark otherwise. The issue is whether the merger will make
things worse, and how bad things already are is irrelevant unless, absent
the merger, they are likely to improve.44
When the points based on misconceptions are eliminated, Harris and
Jorde's criticism of the DOJ Guidelines' approach to market delineation
seems to boil down to a single point. They believe that the Department of
Justice will be much too willing to dismiss forces limiting reactions to a
price increase and, thus, inclined to overestimate those reactions.45 It is
difficult to respond to an attack on thought processes. The best available
evidence on the Department's actual practice is in the cases it has
litigated, and they do not appear to exhibit what Harris and Jorde
predict.
the hypothetical monopolist "could increase its profits" through a significant price increase.
See 1982 DOJ Guidelines n.6, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 14502 n.6.
42 This is not an exhaustive list of Harris and Jorde's criticisms. It merely recounts all
those that they directly or indirectly relate to the conclusion that the DOJ Guidelines yield
overly broad markets.
43 See Harris & Jorde, supra note 32, at 483-84. A more complete statement of the point
is contained in Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's Guidelines for
Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670 (1985).
" For a fuller explanation of the point, see Werden, supra note 38, at 651-53. See also
Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 618, 623-24
n.35 (1983); R. PosNER, AN'rrRusr LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEcnvE 128-29 (1976). There is a
situation in which it is appropriate to use the competitive price in merger analysis--the
mergers of two firms that compete to some extent, but are not in the same market. See
Werden, supra note 13, at 525-26 n.43. See generally Werden, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and the Analysis of "Semihorizontal" Mergers, 27 Axmmusr BULL. 135 (1982).
41 One specific aspect of their argument is that the DOJ Guidelines assume away certain
information imperfections. See Harris & Jorde, supra note 32, at 481-82. This could be a
serious defect in the DOJ Guidelines, depending on how they are interpreted. See Werden,
supra note 13, at 547 & n.106. The 1984 revisions, however, make it clearer that the
significance of the assumption was limited to the tolling of the time period portion of their
price-increase significance threshold "In attempting to determine objectively the effect of a
'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price, the Department in most contexts
will use a price increase of five percent lasting one year .... For the purposes of its analysis,
the Department will assume that the buyers and sellers immediately became aware of the
price increase." 1984 DOJ Guidelines § 2.11, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4492.101.
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I1. MARKET DELINEATION UNDER THE NAAG GUIDELINES
A. Basic Premises and Procedures
Unlike the DOJ Guidelines, with their single unifying theme, the
NAAG Guidelines seek to address a multitude of potentially conflicting
goals. They appear, however, to be animated by only one of them: "The
central purpose of [section 7] is to prevent firms from attaining market
power or monopoly power, because firms possessing such power can raise
prices to consumers above competitive levels, thereby effecting a transfer
of wealth from consumers to such firms."46 Although the logic and
wording differ from those of the DOJ Guidelines' unifying theme, no
significant differences relevant to market delineation are apparent.
Thus, for the NAAG Guidelines to achieve their purpose, they must deem
a group of products and an area to be a market if, and only if, it is possible
to possess market power over them.
The NAAG Guidelines describe the process of product market defini-
tion in the following paragraph:
The Attorneys General will determine the customers who
purchase the products or services ("product") of the merging
firms. Each product produced in common by the merging parties
will constitute a provisional product market. The provisional
product market will be expanded to include suitable substitutes
for the product which are comparably priced. A comparably
priced substitute will be deemed suitable and thereby expand the
product market definition if, and only if, considered suitable by
customers who account for 75% of the purchases. 47
The NAAG Guidelines' describe the process of geographic market defini-
tion in the following paragraphs:
First, the Attorneys General will determine the sources and
locations where the customers of the merging parties readily turn
for their supply of the relevant product. These will include the
merging parties and other sources of supply. To this group of
suppliers and their locations will be added suppliers of buyers
closely proximate to the customers of the merging parties. In
determining those suppliers to whom the protected interest group
readily turn for supply of the relevant product, the Attorneys
General will include all sources of supply within the past two
years still present in the market.
Utilizing the locations from which supplies of the relevant
product are obtained by members of the protected interest group,
46 NAAG Guidelines § 2, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-3, S-4 (footnotes omitted).
47 NAAG Guidelines § 3.1, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-5 (footnote omitted).
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the geographic market will be defined as the area encompassing
the production locations from which this group purchases 75% of
their supplies of the relevant product. 48
Additional "submarkets" are permitted in both cases if price discrimina-
tion is possible.49 Although far from clear on this point, the NAAG
Guidelines might allow additional firms to be added if they would begin
selling in the market in the event of an exercise of market power,5 0 but
their market shares will be limited to the quantity they would sell in the
defined market.51
B. Questions Left Unanswered
It is rather difficult to determine from the descriptions provided by the
NAAG Guidelines exactly how one is supposed to go about delineating
markets. Consider the very first step of the delineation of the product
dimensions of markets. One must identify products produced by both
merging firms. Without having delineated markets, however, it is not
clear how one is to know whether the firms produce the same product or
different products unless, of course, they produce identical products.
Assuming one gets past this stumbling block, the next step is to add
"comparably priced" substitutes. Unfortunately, one is given no clue as to
how to determine whether two prices are comparable. Finally, the market
is defined to include other products if, and only if, they are considered
suitable by customers accounting for 75% of purchases, but no test for
suitability is provided. Are we to assume a price increase as under the
DOJ Guidelines, and if so, of what magnitude? And how are we to
measure purchases? It could be number of transactions, number of units
purchased, or total dollars of purchases.
Despite all the vagaries in delineating the product dimensions of
markets, the NAAG Guidelines are even vaguer on delineating the
geographic boundaries. First, one is supposed to determine where the
customers of the merging firms "readily turn for their supply of the
relevant product." If the merging firms are multiplant, it is not clear
whether this exercise is to be done at the plant or firm level. Of course,
the operative phrase "readily turn" is not defined. Then one is to add
locations "proximate to the customers" of the merging firms, but one is
not told how to define "proximate". Finally, the geographic boundaries of
the market are defined as "the area encompassing the production
locations from which the [protected interest] group purchased 75% of
their supplies of the relevant product." The "protected interest group" is
I NAAG Guidelines § 3.2, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-6.
4 NAAG Guidelines §§ 3.11, 3.22, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-5--S-6.
so NAAG Guidelines § 3.3, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-6--S-7.
5 NAAG Guidelines § 3.4, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-7.
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not defined, but one may infer that it is the customers of the merging
firms and perhaps similarly situated customers as well. Again, what one
is to take 75% of is not defined. But the biggest problem is that, however
the protected interest group is defined and whatever one takes 75% of,
"the area encompassing the production locations from which this group
purchases 75% of their supplies" is not well defined. In general, there will
be thousands of such areas with a dizzying variety of sizes and shapes,
and we are not provided the slightest hint as to which one is to be used.
Finally, it appears that the last step of the process does not require the
preceding step; the last step uses only locations of buyers and the
preceding step defines locations and sellers.
C. The Consequences
It is easily seen that the application of the NAAG Guidelines could
result in the delineation of markets that are overly narrow. They are
overly narrow based not merely on some abstract notion of what the
proper market is; they are too narrow to serve as intended in determining
whether mergers are likely to raise prices to consumers. In most cases,
they will be overprotective of consumers in that they will result in
challenges to mergers that are not reasonably likely to result in price
increases. 52 In some cases, however, overly narrow markets will cause
likely increased prices to consumers to be overlooked and truly
anticompetitive mergers to go unchallenged.
Before elaborating these points, a threshold problem with the NAAG
Guidelines' approach to market delineation should be noted. They may
overlook competition between the merging firms if the merging firms
produce imperfect substitutes. This is due to the fact that the NAAG
Guidelines do not define relevant markets for each product of each
merging firm. They delineate markets only for "[elach product produced
in common by the merging" firms. If the products of the merging firms
are defined very narrowly, this practice sometimes will result in failing
to delineate markets for, or otherwise to analyze, mergers that could
increase prices to consumers. Of course, this problem can be avoided by
defining products broadly, but such a practice sometimes would result in
beginning the process with an overly broad group of products-a result
the NAAG Guidelines rightly seek to avoid. Thus, it is essential to begin
with narrowly defined products and, therefore, improper to consider only
common products of the merging firms.
12 The NAAG Guidelines seem to take the position that challenging mergers that are
not anticompetitive is not a problem because the courts will uphold their legality, while
failing to challenge mergers that are anticompetitive is a problem because private
enforcement cannot be expected to be a backstop. See NAAG Guidelines § 3 n.20, Special
Supp., supra note 5, at 8-5 n.20.
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If markets are delineated under the NAAG Guidelines, their product
dimensions are likely to be overly narrow for two basic reasons. First, the
NAAG Guidelines improperly use pairwise comparisons. They start with
a product and ask whether individual substitutes are in the same market.
By contrast, the DOJ Guidelines would ask whether available substitutes
are sufficiently good that the product is not a market. The distinction
may seem trivial, but it can be profound. Suppose that two sellers of
bagels are proposing to merge and that a tiny increase in bagel prices
would cause sales to fall to virtually zero because customers would
substitute bread, danish, croissants, and doughnuts in roughly equal
amounts. The DOJ Guidelines require at least one of the substitutes to be
added to the market, but the NAAG Guidelines would stop at bagels
because no single substitutes attracted "customers who account for 75%
of the purchases." Clearly, the NAAG Guidelines yield a market that is
overly narrow, which could lead to the challenge of a merger that poses
absolutely no threat to consumers. Suppose now that the merger is
between a bagel firm and a croissant firm and that most (but less than
75% of) bagel customers would switch to croissants if bagel prices rose
while the rest would switch to bread, danish, and doughnuts. In this case,
the NAAG Guidelines again yield a market that is overly narrow, but
this time they would fail to challenge a merger that could increase prices
to consumers. 53
The second basic reason that the NAAG Guidelines delineate the
product dimensions of markets overly narrowly is that they employ an
unreasonably restrictive criterion-the 75% rule. The NAAG Guidelines
add a product to the market only if they are considered "suitable by
customers who account for 75% of the purchases." The preceding discus-
sion explained that pairwise tests for market delineation are inappropri-
ate, so it is necessary to assume that the defect is corrected before
proceeding. Thus, we may restate the test to be that a "provisional
market will be expanded by the addition of the next-best substitute if
available substitutes are considered suitable by customers accounting for
75% of consumption." This still leaves a serious problem of application,
since what is "suitable" is not defined. For the purpose of discussion we
may assume that some price differential standard like that in the DOJ
Guidelines is used and that the standard itself is unobjectionable.54
51 The NAAG Guidelines certainly are not alone in using pairwise comparisons. The old
standard of cross-elasticities of demand inherently involves pairwise comparisons and,
therefore, is improper. See Werden, supra note 13, at 572-73.
54 It seems unlikely that this is what the NAAG has in mind, because it would have been
a simple matter to adopt the DOJ Guidelines' standard. A more restrictive test probably was
intended, and it most likely would not use a price increase standard. It is necessary,
however, to make some assumption before proceeding and unfair to assume an erroneous
standard.
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Even after being recast in the most favorable light, however, the 75%
standard presents serious problems. To see this one need only consider by
how much a monopolist would restrict output below the competitive level.
If less than a 75% restriction would be imposed, then the 75% test it too
restrictive. For arbitrary demand and cost fumctions, the percentage
output restriction that a monopolist would impose could be anything
between 0 and 100%.55 Obviously, the theoretical extremes are not a
sufficient basis for a general rule of thumb. A better guide may be found
in reasonable, simple cases. Once such case is that of linear demand and
constant marginal costs. In this case, the monopoly produces exactly half
the competitive quantity.66 Another reasonable, simple case is that of
constant elasticity of demand and constant marginal cost. In this case
output will be restricted between 63% and 100%, with a restriction in
excess of 75% only for a rather narrow range of elasticities of demand
(from one to two).5 7 Constant elasticity demand curves are concave. If
instead we consider convex demand curves with constant marginal cost,
the output restriction is less than 50%. The output restriction is less,
11 There would be no output restriction if a capacity constraint held output at the
monopoly level. There could be a nearly 100% output restriction if marginal cost was
constant and demand almost perfectly elastic at all outputs above some tiny amount and
relatively inelastic below that quantity.
"6 Letp = price, q = quantity, and c = marginal cost A linear demand function can be
written
p = a - bq,
where a and b are positive constants. Under competition, price equals marginal cost. Thus,
by substituting and rearranging, we see that the competitive quantity,
q = (a-c)Ib.
A monopolist equates marginal revenue with marginal cost. The monopolist's total revenue
is simply pq or
TR = aq - bq2.
By differentiation, marginal revenue,
MR = a- 2bq.
Thus, the monopoly quantity is
q' = (a-c)/2b = q/2.
" A constant elasticity demand function is of the form
p = aqu
,
where a is a positive constant and is the (negative) elasticity of demand. The competitive
quantity is derived by equating price and marginal cost and is
qc = (c/a)'.
The monopoly quantity is derived as before, noting that
TR =aq2+
MR = (I+lk)aq"'.
Thus, we have
qm = [(da)(1l(1 + e))]'.
The ratio of the monopoly quantity to the competitive quantity, thus, is
11/(1 +e)1'.
The quantatative results in the text are derived by substituting values of from just over 1
to infinity into this expression. There is no solution for values of 1 or less.
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often far less than indicated above if marginal cost is increasing rather
than constant or if the basis of comparison is not competition, but rather
some intermediate between competition and monopoly. Either of these
modifications would increase the difference between price and marginal
cost and thereby increase the forgone profit for each unit of output
reduction.
Clearly, the 75% rule is often too restrictive, resulting in overly narrow
markets. Moreover, it is not restrictive enough in some cases, resulting in
overly broad markets. If it were necessary to use a single numerical
standard for the reduction in quantity, 75% is probably too high.
Something in the range of 30% to 50% seems best. However, no single
quantity-restriction standard works in all cases, and it would be wiser not
to have such a hard-and-fast rule. Some flexibility is useful, and the DOJ
Guidelines have that flexibility. Situations in which monopolies would
restrict quantity quite often can be identified rather easily. They are
likely to have roughly constant marginal cost and a highly elastic
demand at the current price but a much less elastic demand at higher
prices. Such a demand structure can be expected only if there are
excellent substitutes for most but not all customers at current prices, but
not good substitutes for the remaining customers even at significantly
higher prices.
The delineation of the geographic boundaries of markets under the
NAAG Guidelines also is likely to produce overly narrow markets.
Although the NAAG Guidelines are not clear on this, it appears that they
define the geographic boundaries of the market as an area encompassing
the production locations of at least 75% of the consumption of some group
of customers. Exactly what group of customers is unclear as is which of
the many areas satisfying this criterion is to be used. One is forced to
speculate somewhat, but the idea seems to be that only sellers (or possibly
also potential sellers) to the undefined customer group can be relevant
competitors and not even all of them are relevant. Whatever was meant,
it seems clear that the NAAG Guidelines would define the geographic
boundaries of markets too narrowly in many cases.
An example makes the point. Assume that identical buyers and
identical sellers both are uniformly distributed throughout a large area.
Further posit that each consumer purchases one unit of the relevant
product and purchases it at the factory gate of the seller with the lowest
delivered price. Finally, assume that sellers have constant production
costs per unit with no fixed costs and constant transportation costs per
unit of distance. In this example, if all sellers charged the same price, as
under competition, each buyer would purchase from that seller located at
exactly the same point as it is. The "protected interest group" for any
seller would be that seller's single customer and perhaps adjoining
customers. The sellers to the protected interest group would be just those
sellers at the same points as the protected interest group. So, for the
merger of two neighboring sellers, the NAAG Guidelines would define a
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market encompassing 75% of these sellers. While not at all clear, the
NAAG Guidelines might add additional sellers that would sell to the
protected interest group in the event of an exercise of market power.
This, however, would make no significant difference.
Even if we give the NAAG Guidelines the benefit of the doubt on this,
and even if we use a 100% test rather than 75%, it is clear that the result
is still not correct. Having not specified any actual economic data, e.g.,
the cost of transportation, it is not possible to know what the correct
market is. What is clear, however, is that the NAAG Guidelines have
ignored much of it. The problem is that, absent price discrimination
which both the NAAG and DOJ Guidelines consider separately, the
protected interest group is protected from exercises of market power by
the surrounding buyers. A price increase to the protected interest group
would also be a price increase to the surrounding buyers and their
decrease in purchases often would deter the price increase.
To make matters more concrete, consider a cartel or hypothetical
monopolist including all sellers within radius r of two adjoining merging
firms. As r increases from zero, the price increase that would be imposed
also increases from zero. How fast it rises depends on per unit transpor-
tation costs, t. If t is small enough, r would have to be arbitrarily large
before a significant price increase would occur. If t is high enough, even
low values of r would yield large price increases.58 Note, however, that
the NAAG Guidelines' market is independent of t, since the protected
interest group and who would sell to them is not affected. Unless t is very
large indeed, the NAAG Guidelines will include but a tiny fraction of the
area encompassing the sellers that actually determine the price to the
protected interest group.
In the case of the merger postulated, the NAAG Guidelines could
greatly exaggerate the likelihood of a price increase to consumers by
delineating the market overly narrowly. Of course, the reverse is possible
as well. If the merging firms were not adjoining, then the NAAG
Guidelines easily could miss the merger's effect on competition.
A final, general point also should be made about the tendency of the
NAAG Guidelines to delineate markets that are overly narrow. The
introduction to the market delineation discussion of the NAAG Guide-
lines emphasizes that judgments should be made on the basis of historical
experience rather than likely future conduct:
Markets should be defined from the perspective of those inter-
ests section 7 was primarily enacted to protect, i.e., the classes of
consumers (or suppliers) who may be adversely affected by an
s The optional nondiscriminatory cartel or monopoly price would be c + rtI3, where c
is marginal production cost. Since the competitive price is equal to c, the price increase
suffered by consumers is rtI3.
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anticompetitive merger. The Attorneys General will utilize his-
torical data to identify these classes of consumers ("the protected
interest group"), their sources of supply, suitable substitutes for
the product and alternative sources of the product and its substi-
tutes. The market thus defined will be presumed correct unless
rebutted by hard evidence that supply responses within a reason-
able period of time will render unprofitable an attempted exercise
of market power.*
*Hard evidence, as contrasted with speculation, is generally
grounded in historial fact. Hard evidence of a probable supply
response would include a factual showing that this response had
occurred in the past when prices increased significantly. A mere
prediction that a manufacturer will shift his production from one
product to another to capitalize on a price increase, when unsup-
ported by evidence of a previous similar response or other
information of similarly probative nature, is not considered "hard
evidence."59
While one may agree that mere speculation should not be relied upon,
the insistence on historical evidence goes much too far.
Most American markets are fairly competitive, and thus mergers
typically arise in fairly competitive markets. History generally will
reveal no attempts to exercise market power, so it is unlikely that
historical evidence can directly answer the difficult questions posed by
section 7. Unless there has been a fortuitous change in relative prices
(due, for example, to a change in costs) that simulated the effects of an
attempted exercise of market power, historical evidence will be unavail-
ing. If only historical evidence is good enough, then substitution possi-
bilities that actually would prevent the exercise of market power will be
systematically ignored. The result again is that markets are defined
overly narrow.
Ill. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The NAAG Guidelines are a response to the perceived laxity of the
Department of Justice's merger enforcement policy, and the specific
standards of the NAAG Guidelines are a reaction to the perceived source
of the Department's failure-market delineation. Analysis of the NAAG
and DOJ Guidelines reveals that the primary, if not exclusive, point of
contention is how the delineation of markets should consider the likely
responses of buyers and sellers in an attempt to exercise market power.
9 NAAG Guidelines § 3 & n.22, Special Supp., supra note 5, at S-5 & n.22.
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The DOJ Guidelines and the Department's application of them are seen
by the NAAG as ignoring important constraints on these responses-
"market realities"-and consequently producing overly broad markets.
However, an examination of the DOJ Guidelines themselves and their
application in litigated cases does not reveal any basis for the NAAG's
concern. But even if the reverse were true, the NAAG Guidelines would
not represent a moderating influence on the radicalism of the Justice
Department. Rather, the NAAG Guidelines are an extremely radical and
ill-conceived backlash.
They are a radical backlash because they frequently yield markets
that are overly narrow by standards that the NAAG and DOJ can agree
on. The NAAG Guidelines' markets are overly narrow for two basic
reasons. First, the specific standards in the NAAG Guidelines for
delineating markets are seriously flawed in a variety of ways that can
cause them to delineate overly narrow markets. Second, in assessing the
available evidence regarding the likely effects of an attempt to exercise
market power, the NAAG Guidelines close their eyes to effects-no
matter how likely-that have not been observed in the past. In both of
these ways, the NAAG Guidelines have forsaken any claim of
moderation or, indeed, of reliance on market realities. Real effects are
routinely ignored.
The NAAG Guidelines' approach to market delineation is ill-conceived
for many reasons. The NAAG Guidelines are a reaction to what appear
to be serious misconceptions about the DOJ Guidelines and how they
are applied by the Department of Justice. The NAAG Guidelines'
approach to market delineation also is very incomplete, poorly exposited,
or both. All important terms and concepts were left undefined. Most
importantly, as a result of an erroneous approach to market delineation,
the NAAG Guidelines will not effectively achieve their purpose of
preventing price increases to consumers that could result from mergers.
By delineating markets that are overly narrow, the NAAG Guidelines
frequently will yield the impression that a merger is likely to increase
prices when it is not. Moreover, in some cases, they will yield the
impression that truly anticompetitive mergers pose no risk of raising
prices to consumers.
Whether the Justice Department or its critics are correct about the
overall level of merger enforcement activity is beyond the scope of this
Article and probably unknowable. Given the present state of knowledge
about the competitive effects of mergers, it certainly is not possible to
prove that the NAAG is wrong. Thus, there is nothing inherently
irresponsible or dishonest about the NAAG's call for stricter enforcement.
The same cannot be said for the NAAG Guidelines and the NAAG's
assertion that merger enforcement is too lax because of defects in the
DOJ Guidelines' approach to market delineation. Both are premised on a
baseless fear that the Justice Department has somehow sabotaged the
process to accomplish an ulterior purpose of scuttling merger enforce-
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ment. The NAAG's views concerning market delineation are not
grounded in market realities, but rather in illusions about the DOJ
Guidelines.
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